The World Inequality Lab is organizing the third edition of the World Inequality Conference, to be held at the Paris School of Economics on June 4-6, 2026.

Objectives

The conference will be structured around three pillars:

1. Release of the Global Justice Report: The report will explore what a just distribution of socioeconomic and environmental resources could look like at the global level from 2026 to 2100 – both between and within countries – in a way that is compatible with planetary boundaries.

2. Keynote Sessions: Speakers will include academics, policymakers and writers.

3. Paper Presentations: Accepted submissions will be organized into parallel theme-wise sessions.

Call for Papers

We welcome submissions of papers on inequality (broadly defined), with a focus on the key research areas covered by the World Inequality Lab, namely:

• • Measurement of historical income and wealth dynamics
  • Environmental inequalities
  • Global wealth distribution dynamics
  • Factors contributing to income and wealth inequality
  • Political inequalities
  • Gender inequality
  • Inequality perceptions
  • Taxation and tax evasion
  • Methodological advances in the measurement of inequalities

To apply, please read the application guidelines, and then fill in the form.

Important Dates

• • Submission Deadline: 1^st December 2025
  • Notification of Decisions: 15^th February 2026
  • Registration Open: 15^th February 2026
  • Registration Deadline: 1^st April 2026
  • Public Release of Programme: 15^th April 2026
  • Registration Deadline: 1^st April 2026

Scientific Committee: The review of submissions will be coordinated by a scientific committee comprising of Lucas Chancel, Ignacio Flores (Co-Chair), Romaine Loubes, Cornelia Mohren, Rowaida Moshrif, Thomas Piketty, and Anmol Somanchi (Co-Chair).

Registration

• • For accepted papers: Deadline is April 1, 2026
  • Conference programme: To be announced on April 15, 2026
  • General public registration: Opens April 15, 2026 | Closes May 15, 2026

Admissions

Registration to the conference and attendance is fully free of charge. Most researchers are expected to finance their own travel and accommodation. A limited number of grants will be made available for young researchers registered at institutions in lower- and middle-income countries. Please make sure to indicate a request for financial assistance in the submission form. Depending upon circumstances, it may not be possible to accept all such requests.

Organization Committee: The overall organization of the conference will be coordinated by an organization committee comprising of Lucas Chancel (Co-Chair), Jonas Dietrich, Alice Fauvel (Co-Chair), Rowaida Moshrif, Moritz Odersky, Thomas Piketty, and Anmol Somanchi (Co-Chair).

Contact

Plenary sessions and most side-sessions will be organized by the WIL. External organizations interested in hosting a side-session are invited to send a brief session outline proposal by 1 December to conference[at]wid.world. Availability is limited, and requests will be considered based on relevance and space.

For any questions, please email conference[at]wid.world.

Partners

The increased global mobility of capital and labour poses a number of challenges to national tax systems: intricate global structures to hide personal wealth from the eyes of tax administrators and regulators, conflicts about the international allocation of taxing rights, a fast-evolving international tax policy landscape. The seminar focuses on the topic of taxation in the global economy and aims to bring together international junior and senior researchers working on international taxation, tax avoidance and evasion, tax competition, tax harmonization and related topics. Presentations can be polished papers or work in progress. The aim is to learn from each other and to discuss in a friendly atmosphere.

The seminar takes place at Paris School of Economics and via Zoom.

Sign-up for the seminar mailing list here.

If you would like to book a private time slot to meet the speaker, please email Rémi Lei remi.lei@psemail.eu or Léo Czajka leo.czajka@psemail.eu specifying which session.

2025-26 Calendar

Friday 5 June 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• TBC

Past Seminars

Friday September 19 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Margarita López Forero (SERMI-DPEM, Banque de France): Offshoring Wage Inequality in Tax Havens with Kevin Parra-Ramirez and Gabriel Smagghue

Friday 26 September 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Laurence Jacquet (CY Cergy Paris Université): Production Regulation Principles and Tax Reforms

Friday 3 October 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Usama Jamal (CY Cergy Paris University): Tax Rules and Capital Reallocation: Real Effects of Anti-Tax Avoidance Policies

Friday 10 October 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-09

• Isabel Micó Millán (Bank of Spain): Inheritance Tax Avoidance Through the Family Firm

Friday 17 October 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Rocco Macchiavello (London School of Economics): Mafias and Firms

Friday 24 October 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Enea Baselgia (ETH Zurich): Inequality and Redistribution in Switzerland: Evidence from Distributional National Accounts

Friday 7 November 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Enrico Rubolino (University of Lausanne, CREST): How Teaching Tax Morale in Schools Shapes Prosocial Behavior

Friday 21 November 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Jakob Brounstein (Institute for Fiscal Studies): Discouraging firm ownership via tax havens in Ecuador

Friday 28 November 2025 12:00-13:00 │ R1-15

• Joana Garcia (Banco de Portugal): Inheritance Tax Avoidance Through the Family Firm

Friday 6 February 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Guillermo Cruces (CEDLAS and University of Nottingham): From Flat to Fair? The Effects of a Progressive Tax Reform

Paper abstract: We study the effects of a progressive tax reform on tax compliance, using a research design that distinguishes between two channels. First, using a quasi-experimental design, we estimate the direct effects of the reform—namely, how changes in a household’s own tax rate affect its own compliance. Second, leveraging a large-scale natural field experiment, we estimate the indirect effects: holding a household’s own tax rate constant, we examine how its compliance is influenced by changes in the tax rates of other, poorer or richer, households. We find substantial direct effects: lowering taxes for poor households increases their compliance, while raising taxes for rich households reduces theirs. We also find sizable indirect effects: when poor households learn about the tax hikes on the rich, their stated perceptions of tax fairness and their actual compliance both increase. Among rich households, learning about tax cuts for the poor also improves perceived fairness, but, if anything, reduces compliance. Using an additional reform and follow-up field experiment conducted a year later, we replicate both the quasi-experimental and experimental results. Together, our findings show that tax compliance responds not only to a household’s own tax burden but also to its perception of fairness of the broader tax system. Our results also underscore the potential disconnect between stated and revealed preferences for redistribution. Finally, we present a counterfactual analysis that illustrates the implications of the direct and indirect effects for designing progressive tax reforms.

Friday 13 February 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Étienne Fize (Institut des Politiques Publiques): Keep It in the Family, or Else! How Tax-Friendly Shareholder Agreements Affect Firm Outcomes

Paper abstract: France offers a large relief from inheritance and gift taxation for business transfers, conditional on signing a shareholder agreement that locks in ownership and management for several years. Using administrative data on transfers of controlling blocks matched to corporate records, we study how business transfers executed under a tax-friendly shareholder agreement differ from other transfers around the date of the transfer. We find that shareholder agreements are associated with greater short-run stability of control and fewer restructurings of the transferred legal unit, but we detect only very limited differences in firms’ “real” decisions (investment, profitability) and no effects on employees’ long-run employment outcomes.

Friday 27 February 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Joana Naritomi (LSE): Does Progressivity Raise Tax Capacity? Experimental Evidence from the D.R. Congo

Abstract: Progressive taxation is a defining feature of high-income countries’ tax systems, but developing countries typically rely on less progressive instruments. We study the introduction of progressive property taxation in a large Congolese city through a citywide field experiment conducted  in partnership with the provincial government. Neighborhoods were randomly assigned to either a progressive or a proportional schedule with equal revenue potential. The progressive system increased total revenue by 55% relative to the proportional one. Revenue gains occurred across the property value distribution: at the top, higher statutory rates mechanically outweighed modest compliance losses, while at the bottom, lower rates induced large compliance gains that more than offset the mechanical loss. Cross-randomized information treatments show that taxpayers’ responses were driven by their own rates rather than by others’ rates or by the perceived fairness of the overall system. Finally, we examine how statutory progressivity maps into effective tax rates (ETRs). Across all systems, ETRs decline with property value — implying that the rich pay less as a share of wealth — and the slope is steepest under the progressive schedule. However, welfare gains are nuanced and an enforcement intervention targeting higher-value properties flattens the ETR relationship, suggesting that investments in enforcement capacity can help align effective with statutory progressivity.

Friday 13 March 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Dzhamilya Nigmatulina (HEC Lausanne): Smart Sanctions

Abstract: This study examines the full causal chain of the impact of the major tool of geoeconomic pressure – targeted or ’smart’ sanctions – on Russian firms in 2014-2021. Using a natural experiment with staggered sanctions roll-out and data from over 2,000,000 firms, it investigates the effects on both targeted entities and the aggregate economy. The study finds contrasting results when focusing on international trade and firms’ outcomes: although smart sanctions reduced total imports of targeted firms by 44%, sanctioned firms experienced a surprising 12% increase in revenue and a 32% increase in capital. The puzzle is resolved by a concurrent increase in government compensation through subsidies, contracts, and loans. While helping the targeted firms, these measures negatively affected the broader economy by worsening misallocation, leading to a drop of up to 0.39% in aggregate TFP. This study highlights that states reallocate the costs of geoeconomic pressure away from targeted firms and onto the general population, and thus may not internalize the full economy-wide costs of such pressure.

Friday 20 March 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• David Henning (University of Oxford): Tax Audits and Their Distortionary Effects

Abstract: Tax audits are intended to raise revenue, but in low-capacity settings they may also distort firm behavior and shrink the formal sector. Leveraging detailed administrative tax data from the Ugandan Revenue Authority (URA), a novel linked survey, and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we show that comprehensive audits can backfire. While comprehensive audits generate tax corrections on impact, they reduce subsequent tax filing and, on net, lower tax liabilities. Audited firms are more likely to shut down, and those that remain operational reduce their sales. We interpret these findings through a dynamic model in which audits impose immediate payment and enforcement costs on credit-constrained firms. The results suggest that tax enforcement affects not only compliance, but also firm survival, production, and growth in low-capacity settings.

Friday 3 April 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Jeanne Bomare (LSE): “Death and Taxes: Inheritance Tax Planning and Unexpected Mortality”

Abstract: We use the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic as a natural experiment to identify the scale and mechanisms of inheritance tax planning in the United Kingdom. By providing an exogenous shock to mortality, the pandemic suddenly truncated the time available for anticipatory planning. Linking administrative inheritance tax returns to high-frequency mortality data, we compare estates of individuals who died unexpectedly during the pandemic with those of observationally similar decedents from pre-pandemic years. We find that unexpected deaths are associated with significantly larger reported estates – increasing the average estate by approximately £350,000 – and a 5 percentage point rise in effective tax rates. Our results indicate that inheritance tax planning reduces effective liabilities by at least 55 percent, representing an annual revenue loss of £3-4.5 billion. We show that inter-vivos transfers, rather than within-estate portfolio restructuring, are the primary planning margin. These findings demonstrate that the ‘seven-year rule’ for gifts is a first-order determinant of the effective tax base and suggest that revenue-raising reforms must prioritize the treatment of lifetime transfers.

Friday 10 April 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Camille Semelet (LMU Munich): “Shifting for Real: Investment Responses to the U.S. Minimum Tax”

This paper studies unintended responses to anti-profit shifting policy, using the introduction of the U.S. Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime as a natural experiment. GILTI targets low-taxed foreign profits of U.S. multinationals. Because it exempts a routine return to tangible assets, firms’ tax liability depends in part on observable real activity. Using affiliate-level panel data on U.S. multinationals operating in Germany and a triple-differences design based on pre-reform foreign effective tax rates, I find that GILTI exposure leads to a large increase in foreign tangible investment. Tangible assets of exposed affiliates rise by roughly 55 percent following the reform, with effects driven by intangible-intensive multinational groups. The results show that features intended to limit profit shifting can generate unintended incentives for real investment.

Friday 24 April 2026 12:00-13:00 │ R1-14

• Adnan Khan (LSE): Rebuilding the Social Compact: Urban Service Delivery and Property Taxes in Pakistan

Paper Abstract: “The social compact between citizen and state – whereby a citizen pays taxes and receives public goods and services – is a critical link in the development process. In many countries, this compact is broken: citizens do not receive high-quality services, because resources are limited by low levels of tax revenue. The low quality of services further leads to a low willingness to pay taxes in addition to a broader lack of trust in the state.  This paper examines whether strengthening the link between property taxes and services can increase citizens’ willingness to pay taxes, improve service delivery, and ultimately revitalize the social compact through a large-scale, long-term randomized controlled trial implemented with the provincial government of Punjab, Pakistan.  We test four interventions: “Ask,” where tax collectors elicit citizen preferences for local services; “Deliver,” where property tax revenue is earmarked for and used to provide local services; “Deliver and Tell,” where service delivery is paired with information to citizens; and “Ask, Deliver, Tell,” which combines preference elicitation, service delivery, and communication to citizens.  We estimate positive but modest effects on tax payments and attitudes toward the state, despite successful delivery of services in treated localities. Effects are largest in the “Deliver and Tell” arm, underscoring the importance of making tax–benefit linkages both salient and credible. We further show that responses depend on the extent to which services are aligned with local needs.”

This project is funded by the European Union. 

The Offshore Talks – An Exploration of Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion and Illicit Financial Flows

How do the wealthy manage to dodge taxes and hide their fortunes in secret jurisdictions? What is the impact of hidden financial flows on the world economy? It’s time to lift the veil! Join us for The Offshore Talks, a groundbreaking lecture series that dives deep into the world of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and illicit financial flows.

? What’s in store? Leading voices from economics, law, political science, investigative journalism, and beyond will converge to share their latest research and real-world insights. Get ready for an exciting lineup of distinguished speakers who will help you navigate the hidden mechanisms that shape global inequality.

The seminar takes place at the Paris School of Economics.

Sign-up for the seminar mailing list here.

Upcomings seminars:

• 18.05.2026: Jason Sharman, Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Cambridge
• 11.06.2026:Katharina Pistor, Professor at Columbia Law School

Past seminars:

?  Offshore: Stealth Wealth and the New Colonialism with Brooke Harrington, Professor of Economic Sociology, Dartmouth College.

?  Crack-Up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World Without Democracy with Quinn Slobodian, Professor of international history at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University.

The Golden Passport: Global Mobility for Millionaires with Kristin Surak, Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the London School of Economics.